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The usual assumption in economic analysis of law is that in a competi
tive market without informational asymmetries, the terms of contracts
between sellers and buyers will be optimal-that is, that any deviation from
these terms would impose expected costs on one party that exceed benefits
to the other. But could there be cases in which "one-sided" contracts
contracts containing terms that impose a greater expected cost on one side
than benefit on the other-would be found in competitive markets even in
the absence of fraud, prohibitive information costs, or other market imper
fections? That is the possibility we explore in this Article.
We focus on the following asymmetry between seller and buyer in cases
in which the latter is a consumer rather than another business or comparable
entity: The seller in such a case may be deterred from behaving opportunis
tically by considerations of reputation; the consumer is not constrained by
such considerations because he has no reputation to lose, assuming that his
opportunistic behavior in a particular transaction will not become known to
the market as a whole. This difference is important whenever it is difficult to
specify contractual terms to cover every important contingency that courts
could accurately and easily enforce. In such circumstances, opportunistic
buyers might try to use "balanced" terms to press for benefits and advan
tages beyond those that the terms were actually intended to provide.
Slanting the terms of the contract in favor of the seller is, we show, a
way of redressing the balance. The existence of a one-sided contract does
not imply that the transaction will be one-sided, but only that the seller will
have discretion with respect to how to treat the consumer. A seller concerned
*
William J. Friedman and Alicia Townsend Friedman Professor of Law, Economics,
and Finance, Harvard Law School. -Ed.
**

Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer in Law, Univer
sity of Chicago Law School. -Ed. We would like to thank Rachel Arnow-Richman, Omri Ben
Shahar and participants in the University of Michigan symposium for their valuable comments. We
are also grateful to Sarah Fackrell, Meghan Maloney, and James Weingarten for their very helpful
research assistance. Bebchuk thanks the Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and
Business for financial support.

827

828

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 104:827

about its reputation can be expected to treat consumers better than is
required by the letter of the contract. But the seller's right to stand on the
contract as written will protect it against opportunistic buyers. A one-sided
contract may thus be preferred ex ante by informed parties as a cheaper
mechanism for inducing efficient outcomes, should contingencies arise dur
ing the performance of the contract, than a more "balanced" contract that,
because of imperfect enforcement, could create costs as a consequence of
consumers' enforcing protective provisions in the contract.
When firms are influenced by reputational considerations, contracts that
appear on paper to be one-sided against the consumer may in reality be im
plemented in a balanced way. The distinction between contracts on paper
and their actual implementation is one that has received much attention from
'
the literature on relational contracts between businesses. As our analysis
highlights, however, the distinction is also relevant to contracts that busi
nesses enter into with consumers who are not repeat players. As long as the
business is a repeat player with the consumer side of the market, its expecta
tion of doing business with other consumers in the future may dissuade it
from enforcing a one-sided contract to the hilt against a particular consumer
even though the business does not expect to have further dealings with that
consumer.
I. EXPLAINING ONE-SIDED CONTRACTS
We consider a competitive market in which sellers offer boilerplate con
tracts that include terms that appear to impose on buyers expected costs that
exceed expected benefits to the seller. Examples are pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses, holder-in-due-course clauses, forum selection clauses in
cruise-ship ticket contracts, and shrink-wrap licenses.
Contracts that contain such terms and, as is typical of such contracts, are
offered to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis are described by critics as
"contracts of adhesion." An older, and pretty well discredited, scholarly lit
erature thought the absence of bargaining showed that the seller must have
monopoly power, enabling him to foist on consumers whatever terms he
liked. But transaction costs plus agency costs, relative to the modest stakes
in most consumer transactions, are sufficient explanations for why sellers

1.
See, e.g, Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational
Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in Merchant Coun: Rethink
ing the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996). The paper
closest to our analysis in its emphasis on problems of observability by courts is Benjamin Klein's
analysis of franchise agreement. See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair"
Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. EcON. REV. 356 (1980).
In his contribution to this symposium, Jason Johnston seeks, like us, to analyze the distinction
between the language and the actual implementation of contracts in the context of contracts between
businesses and consumers. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory

Study,

of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Con

104 MICH. L. REv. 857 (2006). The only prior paper of which we know to have explored
this issue is Clay Gillette's study of rolling contracts that consumers enter into online. See Clayton
P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679 (2004).
sumers,
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2
prefer a form contract to individual negotiations. Nor is it obvious why a
monopolist would offer suboptimal terms rather than just charge a monop
oly price for balanced terms, a price that would be higher because the
3
consumer was receiving greater value.
But this leaves unexplained the one-sidedness of many form contracts.
Scholars often try to explain them as a result of informational problems.
Consumers could be inadequately informed about the provisions included in
4
the contracts or their consequences. Consumers' understanding could also
be distorted by the kind of cognitive problems that are receiving increasing
attention from economists.5 Or sellers could be induced to offer one-sided

contracts by the presence of adverse selection, as we explain in Part IV.6
Scholars who advance these explanations oppose judicial enforcement of
7

contracts of adhesion in the name of unconscionability or similar doctrines.
8

9

Some courts have agreed, but most have not.

Must the presence of one-sided contracts in competitive markets be due
to informational problems? Are courts that enforce such contracts failing to
intervene when they should? Or might there be an explanation that does not
depend on assuming asymmetric information in favor of sellers or other
possible sources of market failure? We show that such an explanation does
exist and that, as a result, the normative inferences that can be drawn from
such contracts are far from being clear and straightforward.
Many one-sided contracts are found in consumer markets that have the
following characteristics: The seller side of the market consists of repeat
players who have a sunk cost in a reputation for dealing "fairly" with con
sumers, in the sense of not taking advantage of one-sided terms as long as
the consumer deals fairly with them. The buyer side of the market consists
of parties that-because they do not have repeat dealings with particular

2.

See, e.g.,

3.

See

4.

See, e.g.,

RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 115 (6th ed. 2003).

Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Con
tracts: An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements (NYU Law and Econ. Research
Paper No. 05-11, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstracts=799274 (citing relevant sources).
Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: ww and Eco24 GA . L. REV. 583, 594-603 (1990).

nomics Meets the Real World,

5.
See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004); see also
Paul Bennett Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damages Clause: A Practical Appli
cation of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REv. 27 (2001).
6.

See, e.g.,

Phillipe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Con6 J.L. ECON. & 0RG. 381 (1990); Eric A. Posner, Contract ww in

tracts Can Enhance Efficiency,

the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limita
tions on the Freedom to Contract,

7.

See, e.g.,

24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995).

Meyerson, supra note 4, at 608-22.

8.
See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Galligan v. Arovitch, 219 A.2d 463 (Pa. 1966); Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996); State ex
rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002); Pittsfield Weaving Co. v. Grove Textiles, Inc.,
430 A.2d 638 (N.H. 1981) (per curiam).
9.
I E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.28, at 560-61 (2d ed.
1998); see, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Seekings v. Jimmy
GMC of Tuscon, Inc., 638 P.2d 210 (Ariz. 1981).
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sellers (the market is competitive, so consumers can switch easily among
sellers) and because privacy rules or other barriers to pooling of information
among sellers prevent sellers from comparing notes about the behavior of
individual buyers--do not have a sunk cost in reputation and hence have no
incentive to deal fairly with sellers in the sense of honoring the terms of the
contract.
In such a situation, the optimal set of contract terms does not depend
only on the relative costs and benefits associated with particular terms. It
also depends on the relative propensity of the parties to behave opportunisti
cally, that is, to take advantage of contractual terms and, in so doing, impose
a cost on the other side that will exceed the benefit to the opportunistic
party.
In the asymmetric-reputation case, the seller has little or no incentive to
behave opportunistically because if he does, he will suffer a loss of reputa
tion, which is a cost. The buyer, however, is not deterred by concern for
reputation. Nor is he dependably deterred by threat of legal action since,
given feasibility limits on drafting contract terms that are free from uncer
tainty, courts cannot always determine when a party is using a contract term
opportunistically.
In this situation, seemingly one-sided terms may not be one-sided after
all. The expected cost of the term to the buyer must be discounted by the
likelihood that reputational considerations will induce the seller to treat the
buyer fairly even when such treatment is not contractually required. This
cost will sometimes be further reduced by sellers' disinclination to sue con
sumers even when they have an ethically as well as legally solid case.
Sellers may still worry that a suit will injure their reputation for fair dealing
(because the term is one-sided), or that the cost of the suit will be dispropor
tionate to the expected benefit. If, therefore, we assume that a court would
be able to determine only whether the litigated contract term is on average
efficient-that is, on average, it burdens the bound party less than it benefits
the obligee-a rule of unconscionability that condemned one-sided terms
would systematically favor opportunistic buyers without protecting fair buy
ers, because the latter are protected by the sellers' investment in reputation.
Consider by way of example the following provision in the standard
contract that Harvard University Press enters into with authors: "[i]f the Au
thor fails to return the corrected proofs sheets by the date set by the
Publisher, the Publisher may publish the Work without the Author's ap
1°
proval of proof." Clearly, given the importance of accuracy to the author,
the publisher's enforcing this provision to the hilt would impose on the au
thor an expected cost greater than the benefit to the publisher, especially
given that the agreement does not limit the publisher's discretion in its
choice of "the date set by the Publisher."
W hat could explain the inclusion of this provision in an agreement re
cently signed by this publisher and one of us and his co-author? It could not
I 0.
See Agreement Between Harvard University Press and Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse
Fried (Mar. 23, 2004) (on file with authors).
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be the publisher's market power. The publisher was seeking in this case, as
in many others, to compete with other publishers on other aspects of the
agreement. Nor could it have been the publisher's expectation that this pro
vision would not be noticed by the authors. Authors are in general likely to
read carefully the short publication agreement. Furthermore, the authors in
this case did notice the provision and asked to amend it, but the publisher
indicated that its policy was not to make amendments to this provision.
Notwithstanding the publisher's insistence on retaining the provision,
the publisher's agent assured th� authors that they do not have to worry
about this provision and other seemingly one-sided provisions included in
the agreement. Although this assurance had no legal significance, the au
thors signed the agreement without worrying that the publisher would abuse
the power given to it by the provision. Indeed, when the authors were a bit
late in returning the proofs, the publisher, as expected, waited for the correc
tions rather than enforcing the provision.
Our explanation is that the provision is intended to protect the publisher
from circumstances in which the author's delay in returning proofs is egre
gious. But if the provision were explicitly limited to those circumstances,
enforcement would be a difficult undertaking for a court because determin
ing "egregiousness" might well depend on information available to the
parties but not easily and accurately observable by the court. The one-sided
provision obviates this concern, while the publisher's reputational interest
protects the authors from the publisher's taking advantage of the literal
meaning of the provision.
In the circumstances we focus on, a one-sided provision allows the busi
ness discretion whether to provide the individual with protection in any
given circumstances. In contrast, because a balanced provision cannot be
written in an unambiguous way, whether protection will be provided in any
given circumstances will be influenced by the court's discretion. In some
circumstances, a strategy of discretionary protection is superior to a strategy
of judicial discretion.
II. A SIMPLE MODEL
Assume a competitive market in which one side (the seller side, consist
ing of many sellers) faces stronger reputationa1 constraints than the other
side does (the buying side, assumed to consist of many individual consum
ers). The sellers are repeat-playing firms, and consumers have information
about their behavior. As a result, sellers are concerned about their reputa
tion. Buyers, however, are not concerned about investing in reputation
because they buy infrequently from a given seller and sellers do not ex
change information about consumers.
In some markets, of course, buyers are not indifferent to their reputation.
They may be firms that are repeat players with powerful incentives to pro
tect their reputation, while the sellers may be individuals that transact
infrequently. An example is the agreements that university presses have with
new authors. Our analysis applies to such markets as well. It can explain, for
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example, why the agreements that those presses have with their authors in
clude provisions that seem one-sided against the author even though authors
are likely to read the terms of these agreements and there is competition
among the publishers. For simplicity of exposition, however, we will assume
in the model that the sellers' side of the market is the one composed of firms
with reputations to protect.
Similarly, not all consumers are well informed about the behavior of
sellers. Indeed, the cost of becoming informed may exceed the benefit, re
sulting in rational ignorance of hidden traps in contracts that competition
11
The novelty of the present analysis is that the same con

may not dispel.

tract forms that are widely assumed to be based on consumer ignorance can
be shown to be consistent with competition under conditions of full infor
mation.
When a contract term is on average efficient, then each buyer's expected
benefit, B, exceeds the seller's expected cost, C: C < B. But "on average"
implies that the term won't be efficient in all the circumstances to which it
literally applies. Assume it will be efficient in state 0, which has a probabil
ity p of occurring, but not in any other state. Assume that the benefit to the
buyer will be B2 > C in state 0 but only B 1 < C in the non-0 state, so that the
average benefit to the buyer is

p(B2)

+

(l-p)(B1).

Assume further that courts will be unable to observe whether the state of
the world in which the contract dispute arises is 0, but the parties will,
though all that is necessary for our analysis to hold is that the parties have
better information about the presence or absence of e than courts have.
Sellers in our model offer to buyers identical take-it-or-leave-it contracts
and are not prepared to renegotiate when the time for performance arrives.
One can think of the sellers as large firms that do not trust their agents to
negotiate contract changes or (a point to which we'll return) that mistrust
consumers who try to negotiate over terms.
If a seller fails to comply with a contract term, the consumer will be able
to obtain from a court an award of expectation damages equal to B. Because
the court will not be able to distinguish perfectly between consumers who
derive a large benefit from the term and consumers who derive only a small
benefit, there will be a tendency to award damages equal to the average
benefit of the contract term that the seller has violated. For the sake of sim
plicity, we assume that the same damages are awarded in all cases in this
class.
Since B > C, if sellers' behavior is not constrained by their concern for
their reputation, the protective term will be included, for without it the seller
would have no incentive to confer B and so the value of the contract would
not be maximized. Inclusion of the term produces an efficiency gain of B2-C

11.
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tux. L.
REV. 1581, 1585-86 (2005).

One-Sided Contracts

March 2006]

833

in state 0 and an efficiency loss of C-B, in the non-0 state, but the net gain is
positive because

p(B2 -C) + (1-p) (C-B1)

=

B-C > 0.

Sellers in a competitive market will offer the term because while they
will be charging a price for the contract that is higher by C (since that is the
cost to the seller of the term), the expected benefit to consumers will be
greater and so consumers will shun sellers who fail to offer it.
This is the standard result when courts cannot observe the exact circum
stances of a given case and there is no contract renegotiation; a term will be
included if the average benefit exceeds the average cost. But it is no longer
the case when reputational considerations are in play. For then, provided
sellers' practices are known to consumers, sellers will offer only a contract
that omits the term benefiting the buyer, but they will have a policy of hon
oring the (nonexistent) term whenever the parties are in state 0.
For example, the term might be that the buyer can return the good and
get his money back, and 0 might be the state in which the buyer returns it
promptly without having used or damaged it. Sellers will charge a price that
is higher by pC because they expect to incur a cost C with probability p, in
cases in 0. But buyers will have an expected benefit of pB2 and thus a net
expected gain of p(B2-C). When some sellers offer such contracts while fol
lowing the policy just described, no seller who fails to provide such a
combination will be able to attract any consumers without losing money.
It might seem that since buyers value the policy, sellers would make it a
term of the contract even if they were constrained to follow the policy by
their investment in reputation. But this is incorrect because, as a contract
term, the policy would require adherence by the seller even when it was in
efficient to provide the benefit, that is, even when the parties were in the
non-0 state. Thus, if the contract provided that the buyer could return the
good if dissatisfied with it, the seller would be obligated to accept the return
even if the buyer, rather than actually being dissatisfied with it, had used it
as much as he wanted to or had damaged it so that it was no longer valuable
to him. Of course, the seller might include some qualifying language such as
"reasonably dissatisfied," but the uncertainty created by such language
would give the buyer some probability of being able to get away with re
turning the good in circumstances not intended to be covered by the clause.
III. POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Our analysis has both positive and normative implications. On the posi
tive side, it can explain the large number of cases in which sellers
dependably treat consumers much better than their contracts require them to
do. Sellers often accept returns in circumstances in which they are not obli
gated to do so. Similarly, hotels usually do not charge a guest for checking
out of his room shortly after the check-out time; publishers commonly do
not send a manuscript to the printer without waiting for the author's correc
tions when the author is late and usually overlook other small breaches as
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well; airlines sometimes give people double mileage credit if a flight is de
layed; and restaurants allow substitutions though the menu states "no
substitutions." Such concessions are not properly regarded as advertising or
price discrimination, because consumers expect them and often would be
indignant if they were withheld.
B ut because they are not legal entitlements, the seller is not at the mercy
of a buyer who would abuse them but not be amenable to legal sanctions.
Suppose, for example, that instead of fixing a rigid check-out time, the con
tract between a hotel and its guests provided that the guest must leave at the
check-out time (or pay for another day) unless he has good cause to delay
his departure for a reasonable amount of time. Such a provision could be
(ab)used by a guest who decides cavalierly to stay in the room, watching
TV, until the evening news. With the rigid check-out rule, the hotel will be
able to charge this overstaying customer for another day while waiving such
charges routinely for customers who miss the check-out time in good faith
and for good reason.
In the circumstances that we study in this Article, courts would do well
to take a hard line in enforcing the terms of one-sided consumer contracts in
the absence of evidence of fraud. Suppose the contract that a seller has with
its customers does not promise them some protection X (say, forgiving
charging for an entire day in the event of a short delay in checking out due
to circumstances beyond a customer's control), but there is evidence that the
seller does commonly accord them X. Should a court view the common
practice as an implicit promise to do so? Our answer is no, because this
would sacrifice the benefits of an unenforceable policy that allows the firm
discretion to withhold a normally expected benefit.
There will be borderline cases because courts frequently use evidence of
past practice or custom to interpret a contract. However, this is done mainly

in cases in which a contractual term is ambiguous. 12 If the term is crystal
clear, as the drafters of one-sided contracts will endeavor to make it, courts
will generally enforce the term as written.
IV. ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION-BASED EXPLANATIONS

We enlarge briefly here on the alternative explanations mentioned earlier
for one-sided contracts. These explanations are based on informational
asymmetries between sellers and buyers. One explanation assumes that con
sumers are at an informational disadvantage. They are uninformed about the
costs that the contract may impose upon them or suffer from cognitive limi
tations and biases when assessing these costs.
The other explanation assumes that there are two types of consumer be
tween which the seller cannot distinguish; in other words, consumers have
the informational advantage. One type, who would value a protective provi
sion more than the other, also happens to be the one that is costlier to serve.

12.
I MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 24.7, 24.9 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., rev. ed. 1998).
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In these circumstances, even if the protective provision is efficient for all
consumers, in equilibrium, no consumer might ask for it out of fear that do
ing so would make the seller suspect that the buyer was of the type that is
costlier to serve.
Our explanation for one-sided contracts has two different implications,
one positive and one normative, from those of the alternative, information
13
based explanations. The distinctive positive implication is that when our
explanation is applicable, firms will not take advantage of the one-sided
contracts: only in exceptional cases will they stand by the letter of the con
tract. In contrast, when one of the two information-based explanations
applies, firms will always (or at least almost always) stick to the letter of the
contract.
The normative implication is that when our explanation is applicable,
the law should not intervene and provide protection not supplied by the con
tract, while if the seller has and is exploiting an informational advantage,
there is an argument for implying protective provisions in the contract to
make it less one-sided. Similarly, in the presence of inefficient pooling pro
duced by adverse selection, imposing protective provisions could sometimes
(though not always) improve matters. The challenge for future research is to
try to distinguish between the domains of our explanation and the informa
tion-based explanations.
We emphasize finally that our analysis is limited to the case of repetitive
selling of consumer products under conditions of good consumer informa
tion about sellers. With infrequent sales or poor information about sellers,
sellers will not be constrained by reputational concerns. Our analysis is
likewise inapplicable when the buying side consists not of individual con
sumers, but of firms that have their own reputational stake in fair dealing, so
that sellers have less concern about being taken advantage of by buyers who
are not reputation-constrained. It is the asymmetry of reputation concerns in
the case of the repeat seller selling to a consumer that drives our analysis.
The potential existence of such asymmetries is a factor to which scholars
and judges should, we contend, pay close attention.

13.
There is a sense in which our explanation is information-based too; but the information
deficit in our analysis is not a deficit of either party to the contract, but of the court that may be
called upon to enforce the contract.
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